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The Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act: Pennsylvania's Response to the
Problems of Municipal Tort Liability
I. Introduction
In 1973 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abolished the doc-
trine of governmental immunity' in the landmark case of Ayala v.
Philadelphia Board of Public Education.2 With the declaration that
"no public policy considerations presently justify its retention,"3 the
court also repudiated the traditional rationale4 underlying the com-
mon-law' rule of governmental immunity. Despite this decision, five
and one-half years later the Pennsylvania General Assembly rein-
stated a modified form of governmental immunity with the enact-
1. An immunity is an avoidance of liability based on the status of the defendant.
"[Ilmmunity does not mean that conduct which would amount to a tort on the part of other
defendants is not still equally tortious in character, but merely that for the protection of the
particular defendant, or of interests which he represents, he is given absolution from liability."
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971).
This comment will address the issue of immunity as it applies to common-law tort actions
against local units of government. Governmental immunity or municipal immunity, as used in
this comment, refers to immunity conferred upon all local units of government, as distin-
guished from sovereign immunity, which applies to state governments. Sovereign immunity
has a separate and much earlier origin. See Comment, Judicial Abrogation of Governmental
and Sovereign Immunity:. A National Trend with a Pennsylvania Perspective, 78 DICK. L. REV.
365 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Perspective]; Note, Municipal Tort Liability: A
Legislative Solution Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16 URBAN L. ANN. 305, 307-12
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Solution].
For a discussion of the development of sovereign immunity, see generally Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers. Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. l (1963); Sloan,
Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation.- Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REV.
209 (1978).
Similarly, governmental immunity must be distinguished from official immunity, which
shields municipal officers and employees from personal liability while acting within the scope
of employment. See generally Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REV.
201 (1956); Vaughn, The Personal Accountability of Public Employees, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 85
(1975); Comment, Judicial Clarification of Common-Law Doctrine. The Pennsylvania Doctrine
of Official Immunity, 84 DICK. L. REV. 473 (1980).
2. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
3. Id at 592, 305 A.2d at 881.
4. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text infra.
5. In Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), the
court joined the majority of jurisdictions in holding that the rule is of judicial or common-law
origin and therefore may be abrogated by the courts in the absence of legislative action to the
contrary. Id. at 602, 305 A.2d at 886. See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 53.02, at 108 (3d ed. 1977 rev. & Supp. 1979). For the historical development of
the common-law rule in Pennsylvania, see notes 35-65 and accompanying text infra.
ment of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.6
The Act represents Pennsylvania's legislative response to the
problems of imposing tort liability on local governmental units. The
crux of the controversy lies in the conflict between two fundamental
but divergent interests: the need for the unhampered and effective
functioning of cities, towns, and counties,7 and the equally desirable
goal of redressing the injuries of the private individual.
Formerly, the courts struggled to fashion an equitable accom-
modation of these interests on a case-by-case basis. With the passage
of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act the Pennsylvania Legis-
lature' assumed the task of drawing the boundary lines of liability.9
This comment will examine the probable impact of the Act upon the
respective interests of the public entity and the private plaintiff. The
Act will be analyzed in the light of the historical development of
governmental immunity, the present-day social, political, and eco-
nomic forces, and the statutory approaches in other jurisdictions.
6. Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act of 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330, §§ 101-803 (codi-
fied at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 5311.101-.803 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80)) [hereinafter referred
to as "the Act"].
7. The Act applies to all political subdivisions, defined by § 102 as follows:
Any county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district, vocational
school district, intermediate unit, municipal authority, home rule, optional plan or
optional charter municipality, any authority created by one or more political subdivi-
sions, and any board commission, committee, department, instrumentality, or entity
thereof designated to act in behalf of one or more political subdivisions.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53 11.102 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
8. Most authorities view legislative action rather than judicial decisions as the more
appropriate vehicle for reform in the field of governmental and sovereign immunity. The
legislature possesses the administrative machinery necessary to conduct hearings and investi-
gations and is better equipped to devise a flexible yet comprehensive solution. Moreover, as
the elected representatives of the people, the legislators are charged with the primary responsi-
bility for formulating public policy. See Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 106,
220 A.2d 896, 898 (1966); Supler v. North Franklin Twp. School Dist., 407 Pa. 657, 660, 182
A.2d 535, 537 (1962); Morris v. Mount Lebanon Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 635-36, 144
A.2d 737, 738 (1958); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pt. 1), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1924);
Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability" A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 UCLA L. REV. 463,
466-67 (1963); Pennsylvania Perspective, supra note 1, at 385-87; Legislative Solution, supra note
1, at 312-17. But see Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 436 Pa. 572, 576-90, 261 A.2d 607, 609-
15 (1970) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (judiciary may properly initiate change in this area); Kee-
ton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 475 (1962)(action by the
courts necessary to overcome legislative inertia); Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures
in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963) (courts are more effective than legisla-
ture as agents of reform). See note 64 infra.
9. "The task which must be undertaken is to locate the specific boundaries within which
tort liability may be imposed upon public entities without unduly frustrating or interfering
with the accomplishment of the other accepted ends for which such entities exist." Van Al-
styne, supra note 8, at 472.
II. Historical Antecedents
A. General Backgroundl
The origin of governmental immunity" has traditionally been
traced to the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 decided in
1788. In Russell, the court sustained the defendant county's demur-
rer to a tort action on three grounds: first, the county was unincorpo-
rated and therefore possessed no fund out of which a judgment could
be satisfied; second, permitting the plaintiff to recover would lead to
an "infinity of actions"; last, a single individual should suffer rather
than the public bear an "inconvenience."13
Russell was first cited as controlling precedent in the United
States in Massachusetts in 1812 t4 and was subsequently adopted
throughout the nation. Among the policy justifications frequently
mentioned in support of governmental immunity were several varia-
tions of the concerns expressed by the Russell court. 5 The protec-
tion of the public purse was always prominent on the list of
10. Numerous scholarly articles and well-documented decisions have chronicled the
history of governmental immunity. Only a brief summary is necessary here to provide the
backdrop for a more detailed examination of the Pennsylvania experience. See generally K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES ch. 25 (1976); Borchard, Government
Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. I, 129, 229 (1924-25); Davis, Tort Liability of
Government Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1956); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Offcers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Damage Actions]; James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610 (1955);
Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 795.
11. Although this comment addresses the immunity concept only as it applies to local
governments, many of the justifications for the doctrine also apply to state governments.
Moreover, the two immunities are inevitably bound together because of the dual nature of a
municipal corporation. On the one hand, it is a creature of the state, obligated to perform
functions of general concern committed to it by the state. On the other hand, it is a corporate
body, much like a private corporation, obligated to serve the needs of the local inhabitants. E.
MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, at § 53.0(a), at 100; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895c com-
ment b at 407 (1977). For a discussion of the impact of this duality on tort liability, see notes
42-44 and accompanying text infra.
The interaction of governmental immunity and official immunity must also be considered
in any discussion of municipal tort liability because a local government cannot act except
through human agents. See notes 213-33 and accompanying text infra. For an excellent dis-
cussion of this interaction and the resulting difficulties, see Bermann, Integrating Governmental
and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1977).
12. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). In Russell, plaintiff brought an action on the case
against the inhabitants of the County of Devon to recover for damages to a wagon that had
struck a hole in a bridge.
Some legal scholars have interpreted the Russell opinion as providing evidence of an even
earlier origin for the doctrine of governmental immunity since Justice Ashurst refers to a pre-
vious case cited in "Brooke's Abridgement." Id at 363. See Maffei v. Incorporated Town of
Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 43, 338 P.2d 808, 810-11 (1959); Pennsylvania Perspective, supra, note
I, at 370-72.
13. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788).
14. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812).
15. A cogent summary of the policy arguments supporting immunity appears in Ken-
nedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 161
(1963).
arguments for enforcing immunity.' 6 Courts reasoned that even if
public funds could be legally diverted from their designated pur-
poses to satisfy tort judgments, the financial drain would lead to ei-
ther a curtailment of services or an extreme tax burden.'7 Since local
governments must often engage in high-risk activities that no private
entity would undertake, immunity was viewed as a necessary shelter
from the resulting tort claims.'8 In addition, proponents of the im-
munity doctrine feared that exposure to liability would encourage
litigation,'9 inhibit aggressive governmental action,2" and subject ex-
ecutive decisions primarily political in nature to judicial review.2'
The unprecedented expansion of government into virtually
every facet of modem life with the attendant proportionate increase
of injuries incurred fostered dissatisfaction with the harshness of the
governmental immunity doctrine.22 Simultaneously, a shift occurred
in the social policy foundations of tort law: the traditional theories
of individualism and self-reliance underlying the fault concept of lia-
bility, while still dominant, began to give way to the principle of
"social insurance."23 The widespread acceptance of the respondeat
16. Ford v. Kendall Borough School Dist., 121 Pa. 543, 549, 15 A. 812, 815-16 (1888).
17. Id at 815.
18. Professor Jaffe elaborates, "[Tihe complex and various activities of government and
the activities of private enterprise are as different as they are alike, and the application of a
doctrine of respondeat superior to government raises a host of problems for which the private
law provides doubtful analogies." Jaffe, Damage Actions, supra note 10, at 211.
19. See Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 329-30 (1860).
20. See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 15, at 178.
21. "No law allows us to substitute the judgment of a jury ... for that of the representa-
tives of the town itself, to whom the business is especially committed by law." Carr v. The
Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 329 (1860). This threat to executive and legislative autonomy
was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in an early decision affirming sovereign
immunity: "[T]o deprive the legislature of the power of judging what the honor and safety of
the State may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to discharge the public debts,
would be attended with greater evils than such failure can cause." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 21 (1889) (breach of contract action); see also Jaffe, Damage Actions, supra note 10, at 235-
37; Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 466.
22. Edwin Borchard is generally credited with spearheading the movement against im-
munity in a three-part law review article in 1924. Professor Borchard's exhaustive study is still
the preeminent historical work in the field. See Borchard, supra note 10. Borchard theorizes
that the easy analogy from compensatory takings to responsibility for damages to property
under nuisance claims led the way to the restriction and eventual demise of the doctrine of
governmental immunity: "From the taking of property to the injuring of property is but a
slight, often a metaphysical or nominal step, so that the tort of nuisance in the maintenance of
public property received wide application." Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tori -
Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 ABAJ 747, 749 (1934). See note 48 infra.
The transition from compensation for property damage to recovery for personal injury
was more difficult, however. According to Borchard, the human toll from automobile acci-
dents provided the initial impetus for change. During the 1920's and 30's numerous states
enacted statutes imposing liability on cities, and sometimes on the state, for the negligent oper-
ation of governmentally owned vehicles. Id Pennsylvania enacted a similar law in 1929. See
note 51 infra.
23. The fault concept shifts the burden of loss suffered from the injured party to the
person who caused the injury. This approach focuses attention on the moral quality of the
conduct of the individual participants. In some cases, as a consequence of the desire to en-
courage unfettered enterprise and competitive activity for the promotion of the general wel-
superior doctrine,24 coupled with willingness to expand liability gen-
erally, accelerated the movement of legal thought toward a tort sys-
tem based on "equitable loss distribution."2
Accordingly, critics attacked the immunity doctrine on the
ground that cities and municipalities are analogous to private corpo-
rations and, therefore, should be treated similarly for purposes of
tort liability.26 Exposure to liability would deter government care-
lessness and irresponsibility. 27 Furthermore, a political subdivision
has a greater capacity to absorb the losses occasioned by the opera-
tion of government and can distribute the costs more efficiently by
passing them on to the taxpaying public. Opponents of immunity
urged that any increased tax burden should be viewed as a necessary
price of the benefits received from governmental activities.28 The in-
creased availability of insurance bolstered their position by provid-
ing security against an undue strain on the public purse.29
Responding to changing social policies and scholarly attack,
New York was the first jurisdiction to remove the protection of gov-
ernmental immunity. The New York Court of Claims Act of 1929,
waiving sovereign immunity, was held applicable to municipal cor-
porations by the New York Court of Appeals in 1945.30 In 1946,
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, which, with certain
broad exceptions, abolished the tort immunity of the federal govern-
ment.3' In 1957 the Florida Supreme Court became the first court in
fare, the value of the conduct outweighs the harm it inflicts. The individual victim then must
bear the burden of the loss.
Tort liability systems based on a policy of "social insurance," however, operate on the
theory that the most efficient way to deal with human accident loss is to assure the victim of
some measure of compensation and to allocate the cost to society as a whole. If a certain type
of loss is the almost inevitable by-product of a desirable activity, the more equitable treatment
is to distribute the cost among the beneficiaries of the activity. The morality at issue, then, is a
more generalized social morality. Workmen's compensation, no-fault systems, and the growth
of liability insurance are symptomatic of a movement toward this risk theory of tort liability.
See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J.
549 (1948); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REV. 41, 48-49 (1949); Van Alstyne,
supra note 8, at 471-72.
24. See Jaffe, Damage Actions, supra note 10, at 210. But see discussion in Mayle v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 397-98, 388 A.2d 709, 715 (1978) (courts under-
stood the analogy between public and private spheres, but simply were unwilling to apply
doctrine of respondeat superior to public authorities).
25. "Equitable loss distribution" is the terminology generally used to designate a system
based on the principle of "social insurance," as discussed at note 23, supra.
26. "The modern city is in substantial measure a large business in6titution ... which
exercises those powers [of government] primarily for the benefit of the people within the mu-
nicipal limits .. " Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
27. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 599, 305 A.2d 877, 884
(1973).
28. Id
29. Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 436 Pa. 572, 579, 261 A..2d 607, 610 (1970) (Pome-
roy, J., dissenting).
30. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945) (construing N.Y.
CT. CL. ACT § 8).
31. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976)).
the nation to judicially abrogate the doctrine.32 Other courts soon
followed suit.33 In most jurisdictions, the legislature adopted a statu-
tory scheme to fill the gap left by judicial abrogation.
34
B. Pennsylvania Precedents
Legal scholars have failed to pinpoint the precise date at which
the doctrine of governmental immunity was accepted in Penn-
sylvania.35  Although sovereign immunity was discussed in decisions
dating back to 1788,36 the first cases considering governmental im-
munity did not appear until the 1840's. 37  In Dean v. New Milford
Township, an 1842 decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a
township responsible for an injury caused by the poor condition of a
highway that the township supervisors were obligated to repair pur-
suant to state statute. 38 Relying on Dean, the supreme court subse-
quently imposed liability in a series of decisions in which a
32. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
33. By 1966, twelve jurisdictions had abrogated governmental immunity, ten by judicial
decree. By 1972, thirteen others abolished the doctrine, with the courts taking the initiative on
ten occasions. Pennsylvania Perspective, supra note I, at 368-69 nn.19 & 23. For the citations
of decisions abrogating immunity as of 1978, see 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, at § 53.0(a)
n. 5.
34. For an excellent state-by-state survey of governmental immunity and tort claims stat-
utes, see Harley & Wasinger, Governmental Immunity.- Despotic Mantle or Creature of Neces-
sity, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 12, 33 app. (1976). A more recent but less informative summary
appears in Kennedy, Tort Liability and Sovereign Immunity. 4n Overview, 19 MUNICIPAL AT-
TORNEY 194, 196-98 (1978).
35. See generaly Schultz, The Liability of Municpal Corporations for Torts in Penn-
sylvania, 40 DICK. L. REV. 137 (1936); Pennsylvania Perspective, supra note i; Note, Municipal
Tort Liability in Pennsylvania - Checkered immunity, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 93 (1951) [here-
inafter cited as Checkered Immunity]; Note, Tort Liability of Munictpal Corporations in Penn-
sylvania, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 674 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Tort Liability].
36. Respublica v. Sparhawk, I Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788). In Sparhawk, the court denied the
plaintiff's claim for the value of goods seized during the Revolution by agents of the Common-
wealth. A later case interpreted Sparhawk as precluding recovery in a tort action against the
state. See Black v. Rempublican, I Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792).
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. 9, § I I stated, "Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth
in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct." The
courts traditionally construed this article, which was incorporated into subsequent constitu-
tions, to prohibit suit against the Commonwealth absent statutory consent by the legislature.
See Biello v. Penn sylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973) (construing
PA. CONST., art. I, § II). But see Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388
A.2d 709 (1978). In Mayle, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abolished sovereign immu-
nity, holding that art. 1, § 1 I does not mandate immunity. Id at 405-06, 388 A.2d at 719. The
court in Mayle also took the position that Black and Sparhawk, when limited to their facts, do
not operate as precedents for the imposition of immunity. Id at 391-93, 388 A.2d at 712-13.
Rather, the Mayle court pinpoints O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851), as the first case
to unequivocally adopt sovereign immunity. Id at 403, 388 A.2d at 718.
37. Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & Serg. 103 (Pa. 1841) (wrongful seizure of horse
by police superintendent) is often cited as establishing governmental immunity in Penn-
sylvania, but the decision actually turned on the fact that the act was outside the officer's scope
of authority.
In Green v. Reading, 9 Watts 382 (Pa. 1840), and in The Mayor v. Randolph, 4 Watts &
Serg. 514 (Pa. 1842), the respective municipalities were absolved of liability. Both cases con-
cerned consequential property damage arising from road construction.
38. 5 Watts & Serg. 545 (Pa. 1843).
municipality violated a statutory duty. 39 Attempting to further de-
lineate and limit municipal liability, courts held that the statute must
mandate governmental action rather than merely authorize it. Ac-
cordingly, in Carr v. The Northern Liberties,4" the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted this distinction and thereby restricted mu-
nicipal liability to breaches of mandatory (ministerial) rather than
discretionary statutory obligations.4'
Another slightly later line of cases developed a second distinc-
tion founded upon the dual functions of local government. 42 In gen-
eral, governmental activities, pursuant to powers conferred on the
municipality as an agent of the state and performed for public pur-
poses, were protected from liability.43 Those actions undertaken in
the municipality's corporate or proprietary capacity for its private
benefit, however, were subject to liability in the same manner as the
conduct of any private business corporation."
Eventually, the two distinctions, mandatory-discretionary and
39. Dean was followed in cases relating to navigable rivers, Winpenny v. Philadelphia,
65 Pa. 135 (1870); streets, Erie v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. 384 (1853); and bridges, Rapho Twp. v.
Moore, 68 Pa. 404 (1871); Humphreys v. Armstrong County, 56 Pa. 204 (1867).
40. 35 Pa. 324, 330 (1860).
41. The court hesitated to interfere with the local government in the exercise of its au-
thorized powers when it was alleged that it had negligently constructed and maintained sewers.
"We do not admit that the grant of authority to construct sewers, amounts to an imposition of
a duty to do it . . .that authority is essentially discretionary. . . .We cannot treat it as im-
posed here, without assuming an improper control of municipal affairs." Id (emphasis ad-
ded). The problem of judicial review of executive and administrative action is considered at
note 180 infra.
42. See note I I supra.
43. Theoretically, municipalities performing public functions as agents of the Common-
wealth enjoy the sovereign immunity of the state. See Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super.
Ct. 86, 91 (1919).
44. The distinction originated in the New York courts in Bailey v. City of New York, 3
Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842). Most scholars point to Western Sav. Fund Soc'y v.
Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175 (1854) (contract action), and 31 Pa. 185 (1858) (same parties; equity
action) as the first instance in Pennsylvania of a differentiation between g,ernmental and
proprietary functions. Checkered Immunity, supra note 35, at 95 nn.22-23; Tort Liability, supra
note 35, at 679.
The tests usually applied to determine the status of the activity in question included: first,
was the act for the benefit of the public or for the profit of the governmental unit; second, was
the function one traditionally performed by government or does private enterprise also carry
on such activity; and last, was profit actually derived from the activity. Note, 35 MERCER L.
REV. 969, 972 (1974). See generally Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public
and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municioal Corporations,
16 ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937).
Many of the earliest cases in which the court designated a government's action as proprie-
tary pertained to municipally-owned utilities. See, e.g., Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 492, 31
A. 728 (1895) (electricity); Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. 41 (1885) (gas); Philadelphia v.
Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140 (1872) (water); Western Sav. Fund Soc'y v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 185
(1858) (gas).
One commentator has suggested that the governmental-proprietary distinction was based
in part upon a concern for the municipal corporation's coffers. The fear of financial ruin was
mitigated by the proprietary activity's revenue-producing features. Furthermore, feeling ex-
isted that immunizing a proprietary activity gave the municipality an unfair advantage over
private competitors. Checkered Immunity, supra note 35, at 102.
governmental-proprietary, became intertwined and confused.45 By
1924 the courts had restricted the application of the ministerial-dis-
cretionary rule to the proprietary or corporate side of a municipal-
ity's dual functions.46 Thus, liability was imposed only if two
criteria 47 were met: first, the area of activity was proprietary in na-
ture, and second, the particular duty breached did not include the
exercise of discretionary powers.48
After years of decisionmaking, rigid areas of liability and im-
munity solidified through the process of stare decisis. Improper
maintenance of streets, bridges, and sidewalks, 49 negligent manage-
45. See Tort Liability, supra note 35, at 676-82 (tracing the development and interaction
of the two rules). See also Schultz, supra note 35, at 15 1-52.
46.
[T]o avoid confusion in reading the cases, it should be kept in mind that the words
"absolute," "imperative" and "ministerial," as used in the rule, denote a definite
duty, performance of which can be demanded of officials empowered to act, and the
neglect or omission to perform such a duty is treated in the law as a basis of liability
where the obligation attaches to the city in its corporate, or private, capacity ...
Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 554, 124 A. 273, 275 (1924) (emphasis added).
47. Compare these prerequisites for recovery against a local government under the com-
mon-law with those set up under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. See note Ill and
accompanying text infra..
48. As a result, in some cases in which the municipality was required by law to act, such
as when statutes mandated the operation of schools, police, and fire departments, the courts
granted immunity, nevertheless, because the municipality was performing in a public capacity.
Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 312 Pa. 260, 167 A. 782 (1933); see Ford v. Kendall Borough School
Dist., 121 Pa. 543, 549, 15 A. 812, 816 (1888) (noting refusal of courts to extend liability on
ministerial-mandatory basis to police, fire, sanitary, and pauper departments). See also How-
ard v. Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 184, 95 A. 388 (1915).
An exception to immunity developed, however, for common-law nuisance actions, regard-
less of the characterization of the activity in question as "governmental," "proprietary," "dis-
cretionary," or "ministerial." See Zellman v. City of Philadelphia, 17 Pa. D. & C. 493 (C.P.
Phila. 1932) (gathering and disposal of refuse constitutes exercise of governmental function
and municipality is not liable for injuries resulting therefrom unless it creates or maintains a
nuisance). Accord, Pelliccioni v. Gallitzin Borough, 18 Cambria 193 (Pa. C.P. 1957). See also
note 22 supra (influence of nuisance exception on demise of immunity doctrine). Conse-
quently, yet another artificial distinction, between nuisance and negligence, was sometimes
interjected into the hopelessly muddled system of rules defining governmental immunity. Re-
sourceful counsel often couched the pleadings in terms of nuisance to circumvent governmen-
tal immunity. But see Carlo v. Scranton School Dist., 319 Pa. 417, 419, 179 A. 561, 562 (1935)
(nuisance claim based on faulty premise that every negligent act constitutes a nuisance). Ac-
cord, Klein v. Cheltenham Twp., 96 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 141, 143 (Pa. C.P. 1972) (governmen-
tal immunity may not be avoided by semantics).
49. See Harrison v. City of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 22, 44 A.2d 273 (1945) (sidewalk); Scott v.
City of Erie, 297 Pa. 344, 147 A. 68 (1929) (street); Lawrence v. Scranton City, 284 Pa. 215, 130
A. 428 (1925) (street).
Liability for these activities developed as a norm prior to the generalized use of the pro-
prietary-governmental distinction. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. Thus, it is more
appropriate to classify highway maintenance as an historical exception to the rule of immunity
for negligence in the performance of governmental functions:
Finally, in certain established instances, failure to comply with a duty of like
imperative nature may also create a liability when a municipality acts in its public
capacity, for example, in connection with the building or construction of highways or
public works, or their repair . . . ; but, to date, these examples, and instances of
nuisances on, or improper use of, governmentally owned real estate . . . seem to
mark the limit of municipal responsibility in respect to the exercise of public or gov-
ernmental duties . . ..
Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 555, 124 A. 273, 275 (1924).
ment of utilities, 50 reckless operation of vehicles, 5' and negligence in
the care of public land and buildings52 invariably resulted in liabil-
ity. At the other end of the spectrum, tort actions concerning police
officers and firefighters,53 schools,54 hospitals and health services,55
jails,56 and polling places, 57 were consistently shielded by immu-
nity.58
Thus, over time, the rules, labels, and rationalizations became
enshrined as precedents whose mechanical application created an il-
logical and basically inequitable5 9 body of law far removed from the
50. Shirk v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 164-65, 169 A. 557, 560 (1933). See note 44 supra.
5 1. Liability for negligence in the operation of a vehicle was established by statute in
1929. Act of May 1, 1929, P.L. 905, art. 6, § 619 (formerly codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1576, 7723(d) (Purdon 1977)) (repealed by 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5311.802 (a) (Purdon Supp.
1979-80)). See note 22 supra.
One commentator has suggested that the Act of 1929 was a reaction to Scibilia v. Philadel-
phia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 A. 273 (1924). In that case, plaintiff, injured when struck by a garbage
truck, was denied recovery because refuse collection is a health service and, therefore, a gov-
ernmental function. See Tort Liability, supra note 35, at 687 n.92.
Other provisions of the Act, however, limited recovery to situations in which the negli-
gence amounted to "a reckless disregard of the safety of others." Act of May 1, 1929, P.L. 905,
art. 6, § 1002(0 (current version at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3105(e) (Purdon 1977)). The
courts interpreted this qualification as a lower standard of care. See Junk v. East End Fire
Dept., 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 473, 483, 396 A.2d 1269, 1273 (1978). But see notes 165-66 and
accompanying text supra.
52. Apparently, emphasis on the essentially proprietary nature of land ownership, despite
its governmental use, was at least partially responsible for the finding of liability in these cases.
See Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451, 459, 19 A. 1038, 1039 (1890). Pennsylvania extended
liability to the maintenance of public parks and recreational activities, a minority position. See
Checkered Immunities, supra note 35, at 103 n.95. See e.g., Honaman v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa.
535, 185 A. 750 (1936). In other situations, however, characterization of the use of the particu-
lar property as proprietary or governmental controlled the question of liability. See notes 54-
57 infra. See also Checkered Immunities, supra note 35, at 98-99.
53. Steele v. McKeesport, 298 Pa. 116, 148 A. 53 (1929) (police); Kies v. Eie City, 135
Pa. 144, 19 A. 942 (1890) (fireman); Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (police).
54. Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966); Supler v. North
Franklin Twp. School Dist., 407 Pa. 657, 182 A.2d 535 (1962). But see Morris v. Mt. Lebanon
Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958), in which liability was imposed on a
school district because its recreational program was considered a proprietary activity.
55. Hospitals were protected by charitable immunity until the abrogation of the charita-
ble immunity doctrine. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
After Flagiello, city and county hospitals were subjected to liability, but state hospitals were
shielded by sovereign immunity. Compare Miller v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 428
Pa. 504, 239 A.2d 340 (1968), with Poklemba v. Shamokin State Gen. Hosp., 21 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 301, 344 A.2d 732 (1975). Under the current statutory formulations, the situation is re-
versed. See note 157 and accompanying text infra.
56. Cousins v. Butler County, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 86 (1919).
57. Kraeling v. Dormont Borough, 352 Pa. 644, 44 A.2d 274 (1945).
58. A municipality was not liable for the intentional torts of its employees when they
were acting in a governmental capacity. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d
378 (1960) (municipality is not liable for assault by police because municipality acts in a gov-
ernmental capacity as the agent of the state in appointing police), accord Jenkins Sportswear v.
City of Pittston, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 566 (C.P. Luz. 1960) (city immune for actions of mayor and
chief of police in performance of governmental duties). But a municipality was usually held
responsible for a trespass committed by an official in the course of his duties. Liability was
incurred regardless of whether the action was governmental or proprietary in nature. Dalton
St. Ry. Co. v. Scranton, 326 Pa. 6, 191 A. 133 (1937); Brink v. Dunmore, 174 Pa. 395, 34 A. 598
(1896). A trespass wholly ultra vires, however, or beyond the scope of the employee's author-
ity would yield personal liability only. See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, at § 53.11 at 144.
59. Inconsistent and conflicting decisions abound. Compare Shields v. Pittsburgh School
initial policies6" underlying the governmental immunity doctrine.6 '
C. The Ayala Decision and Its Progeny
As early as 1924, in Scibilia v. City of Philadelphia,62 the judici-
ary recognized the inconsistencies present in the application of the
governmental immunity doctrine and began to call for legislative ac-
tion.63 With no action forthcoming, and after numerous other juris-
dictions had judicially abolished immunity, the court in Ayala v.
Philadelphia Board of Public Education determined that justice de-
manded judicial abrogation of a doctrine judicially created.' The
Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 184 A.2d 240 (1962) (operation of a playground during vacation is a govern-
mental function) with Morris v. Mount Lebanon Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737
(1958) (operation of summer recreation program is a proprietary function). Compare also Hill
v. Allentown Hous. Auth., 373 Pa. 92, 95 A.2d 519 (1953) (maintenance of city dump is propri-
etary function) with Kunz v. Titusville, 373 Pa. 528, 97 A.2d 42 (1953) (maintenance of an
incinerator plant is a governmental function). Compare Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549,
124 A. 273 (1924) (collection of garbage is a health measure and therefore, a governmental
function) with Gemmill v. Calder, 332 Pa. 281, 283, 3 A.2d 7, 8 (1938) (ownership of sewage
system is proprietary function).
60. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
61. Recent critics of.governmental immunity have seized upon the development of the
ministerial-discretionary and governmental-proprietary distinctions as evidence of an erosion
of the immunity doctrine. They interpret the distinctions as judicially engrafted exceptions to
a more generally applied rule of immunity. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
216, II Cal. Rptr. 89, 92, 359 P.2d 457, 460 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.
No. 302, 18 111. 2d 11, 17, 163 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1959); Morris v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. School Dist.,
393 Pa. 633, 637-38, 144 A.2d 737, 739 (1958). See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, at § 53.02
at 104-05.
Although the courts have utilized the distinctions in recent times to restrict immunity and
to mitigate the harsh effect of the doctrine on injured plaintiffs, see Morris v. Mt. Lebanon
Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958), the distinctions were not created for that
purpose. The governmental-proprietary and ministerial-discretionary rules were actually ra-
tionalizations invoked by the judiciary, for various policy reasons, to protect local governments
from liability. Thus, in Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860), the discretionary-
ministerial rule was announced because tort liability might unduly hamper the administration
of local government. Similarly, in Ford v. Kendall Borough School Dist., 121 Pa. 543, 15 A.
816 (1888), the court refused to apply the mandatory duty rule to a school district, carving out
a "governmental activity" exception because liability might prove too financially burdensome.
Total immunity was not, in fact, the general status of early Pennsylvania common-law. See
notes 35-59 and accompanying text supra. See also Checkered Immunity, supra note 35, at 93-
96; Schultz, supra note 35, at 150-67.
62. 279 Pa. 549, 124 A. 273 (1924).
63. Id at 563-64, 124 A. at 278. The voices requesting change grew more insistent with
the passage of time. Compare Morris v. Mount Lebanon Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 635-
36, 144 A.2d 737, 738 (1958) (comprehensive legislative program sorely needed) with Laughner
v. County of Allegheny, 436 Pa. 577, 261 A.2d 607 (1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (despairing
of legislative response). See note 8 supra (judicial deference to legislative action).
64. 453 Pa. 584, 600-02, 305 A.2d 877, 885-86 (1973). For a thorough analysis of the
Ayala decision, see Note, 25 MERCER L. REV. 969 (1974).
Professor Peck asserts that the realities of the legislative process dictate a more creative
role for the courts in tort reform. Legislators are basically indifferent to tort law-making.
They lack experience, time, and adequate wages, and fail to hold satisfactory committee and
public hearings. In addition, they are subject to well-organized lobbies and pressure groups.
To overcome legislative inertia, Professor Peck maintains that the courts must take abrupt
action beyond the usual bounds of judicial restraint and deference to the legislature. Peck, The
Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963).
Several authorities attribute the longevity of the governmental immunity doctrine to legis-
lative inertia and an absence of an identifiable and organized interest group to press for legis-
court noted, "We closed our courtroom doors without legislative
help, and we can likewise open them."65
Embracing the rationale and social policy considerations pro-
pounded by the numerous critics of the doctrine, 66 the Ayala court
abruptly and totally withdrew the protective cloak of immunity sur-
rounding local governmental units.67 Although it did not expressly
define the scope of local governments' new-found liability,68 the de-
cision implicitly placed political subdivisions in the same position as
individuals and private corporations for the purposes of tort liabil-
ity.
69
The removal of immunity presented few problems in most situa-
tions. The effect was simply an extension of liability to areas and
activities previously protected. 70 The courts encountered more diffi-
lative review of the doctrine. The interests that enjoy the protection of governmental
immunity, however, exercise considerable power in the legislative process. In this view, action
by the courts provides the necessary impetus to induce legislative consideration of the immu-
nity problem. See Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 110, 220 A.2d 896, 899 (1966)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United
States, 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 821-27; Note, 25 MERCER L. REv. 969, 979 (1974).
65. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 600, 305 A.2d 877, 885 (1973).
66. Id at 594-97, 305 A.2d at 882-83. See notes 22-29 and accompanying text supra.
67. After Ayala, political subdivisions attempted to invoke the protection of sovereign
immunity as an instrumentality of the state. See Black v. Weaver, 18 Adams 64, 67 (Pa. C.P.
1976). These attempts invariably failed, although on occasion the court would have difficulty
in determining whether the particular political subdivision was a state agency or a local entity.
See Greer v. Metropolitan Hosp., 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 266, 341 A.2d 520 (1975).
68. Ayala merely states that governmental immunity is abolished in Pennsylvania. Ayala
v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 587, 305 A.2d 877, 878 (1973).
69. In dictum, Justice Roberts declared, "Recently, this Court reiterated the prevailing
philosophy that liability follows tortious conduct. . . . Appellee offers no reason - and we are
unable to discern one - for permitting governmental units to escape the effect of this funda-
mental principle." Id at 594, 305 A.2d at 882.
Later decisions have generally interpreted the Ayala ruling as a mandate for equal treat-
ment of public and private tortfeasors. See Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27,
30 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'g in part, 398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Ayala unqualifiedly abro-
gated immunity, left no exception for exercise of discretion); Fairman v. Gallagher Warehous-
ing Corp., 2 Phila. 621 (Pa. C.P. 1979) (order denying preliminary objections) (Ayala intended
to make government defendant subject to liability to same degree as private defendant); King
v. Sullivan, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 318, 324 (C.P. Adams 1974) (time has come, especially since
Ayala, for government to be as fully responsible as private enterprise). But see Santucci v.
Windber Borough, 31 Som. 289, 293 (Pa. C.P. 1975) ("if an absolute duty as opposed to a
discretionary duty is shown the city would be liable .. "-inferring a discretionary excep-
tion).
Most post-Ayala decisions rest upon a traditional duty analysis. "'[Duty' is a question of
whether a defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiffs, and in
negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable
conduct in the light of apparent risk." W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 324.
In Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 289 (Pa. C.P. 1975), the court quite correctly
explained the Ayala decision as removing immunity from governmental functions, those areas
previously protected, but noted that "still one must inquire into the duly of a municipal-
ity .. " Id at 294 (emphasis added). See also Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 536
F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'g inpart, 398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (no duty to plaintiff-
landowners outside of borough limits); Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. City of Lebanon, 247
Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 372 A.2d 460 (1977) (no duty to provide water for fire fighting, but duty to
maintain system in proper working order once undertaken); Black v. Weaver, 18 Adams 64
(Pa. C.P. 1976) (no duty running to plaintiff).
70. Laughlin v. City of Pittsburgh, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 431, 310 A.2d 289 (1973) (police-
cult questions, however, in cases of passive negligence or nonfea-
sance, such as the failure to enforce or enact ordinances, 7' to issue or
deny permits, 72 and to provide police, fire, and other services.
73
Prior to the Ayala decision, a municipality could protect itself
from liability for negligence in these areas based upon a variety of
theories: first, the activities might constitute "purely governmental"
functions;74 second, they could be considered quasi-legislative in na-
ture;75 third, they might require the exercise of discretion;76 fourth,
the municipality generally has no obligation to provide a benefit;
77
and last, the government action could be viewed as undertaken on
behalf of the public at large, without any duty owed to an individual
plaintiff.
7 s
man in pursuit of criminal shoots bystander); Edwell v. County of Allegheny, 226 Pa. Super.
Ct. 429, 310 A.2d 340 (1973) (chair collapses in courthouse); Snyder v. Shamokin Area School
Dist., 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 369, 311 A.2d 658 (1973) (iron fence in school yard fell on child).
Prior to Ayala each of these cases would most likely have been designated governmental activ-
ities and would have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
71. See Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976), rev g in part,
398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Royal Indem. Co. v. City of Erie, 372 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D.
Pa. 1974); Fairman v. Gallagher Warehousing Corp., 2 Phila. 620 (Pa. C.P. 1979) (order deny-
ing preliminary objections).
72. See Black v. Weaver, 18 Adams 64 (Pa. C.P. 1976); King v. Sullivan, 68 Pa. D. &
C.2d 318 (C.P. Adams 1974).
73. See Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. City of Lebanon, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 372 A.2d
460 (1977); Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 289 (Pa. C.P. 1975); Williams v. McCor-
mick, 64 Luz. 83 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
74. See notes 42-44, 53-58 and accompanying text supra.
75. Although Pennsylvania's case law subsequent to Ayala did not specifically consider
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial exceptions to liability, other jurisdictions abrogating immu-
nity have examined this theory. In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla.
1957), the Florida Supreme Court rejected liability for the exercise of "quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial functions. ... See also Akin v. City of Miami, 65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953)
(wrongful refusal to grant a building permit); Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180
So. 378 (1938) (enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance). In Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31
Som. 289, 291-92 (Pa. C.P. 1975), the court noted in dictum, "Delegation of power to legislate
does not create an absolute power to legislate in a particular way." The court then cited a 1901
case refusing to find a borough liable for not enacting an ordinance prohibiting dogs running
at large. Thus, the Santucci court appears to adopt the quasi-legislative exception carved out
by the Florida courts.
76. See note 41 and accompanying text supra. See also Fiduccia v. Summit Hill Constr.
Co., 109 N.J. Super. 249, 262 A.2d 920 (1970) (negligent issuance of certificate of occupancy).
77. The classic formulation of the benefit, or affirmative action, rule was expressed by
Justice Cardozo in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928):
"The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as to have
launched a force or instrument of harm or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to
become an instrument for good." Id at 168, 159 N.E. at 898.
This argument is really a variation on the discretionary exception. See German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 227 (1912); Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water
Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964).
78. This rationale is sometimes referred to as the special duty doctrine. Essentially,
plaintiff's cause of action must be grounded upon some duty owed to plaintiff individually as
opposed to the public generally. Compare King v. Sullivan, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 318 (C.P. Adams
1974) with Black v. Weaver, 18 Adams 64 (1976).
For an excellent discussion of the special duty doctrine as applied to the duty to provide
police protection, see Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 289 (Pa. C.P. 1975). But see
Fairman v. Gallagher Warehousing Corp., 2 Phila. 620 (Pa. C.P. 1979) (order denying prelimi-
nary objections). See generally Comment, State Tort Liabilityfor Negligent Fire Inspection, 13
With the Ayala decision, the court withdrew the legal shelter of
the governmental and discretionary function rationales.79 Although
the other arguments against government liability theoretically re-
mained valid, the lower courts increasingly widened the ambit of
duty owed by governmental units to individual citizens. Cases sub-
sequent to Ayala recognized the following as proper causes of action:
the negligent inspection of a sewage system and issuance of a per-
mit;8" the absence of police intervention in an altercation;8 the fail-
ure to enforce building codes;82 the approval of deficient subdivision
plans;83 and the failure to provide sufficient water for firefighting.84
A few of these decisions proceeded on the ground that a service, al-
though voluntarily undertaken, must still be performed with due
care.85 Other holdings rested on the finding of a "special duty" to
the plaintiff.86 In sum, the post-Ayala trend was a liberal one,
broadly interpreting the legal concepts of duty and foreseeability and
moving toward the imposition of liability for the breach of a general
public duty.87
III. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
A. Problems and Perspectives - Toward a Legislative Purpose
The full impact of complete exposure to tort liability after Ayala
took time to filter down to the towns and municipalities. 88 Gradu-
ally, local government associations began to voice their concern,
calling for legislation to fill the void left by the Ayala decision.89
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 303 (1977); Comment, Municipal Liabilityfor Negligent Inspection,
23 Loy. L. REV. 458 (1977).
79. See notes 68-69 supra.
80. King v. Sullivan, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 318 (C.P. Adams 1974).
81. Santucci v. Windber Borough, 31 Som. 289 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
82. See note 71 supra.
83. Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd in part,
536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976).
84. Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. City of Lebanon, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 372 A.2d 460
(1977).
85. Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. City of Lebanon, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 277, 372 A.2d 460
(1977); Fairman v. Gallagher Warehousing Corp., 2 Phila. 620 (Pa. C.P. 1979)(order denying
preliminary objections).
86. See note 78 supra.
87. "Once there is a duty owed to the public generally, it is a duty owed to individual
members of the public, if they are in the class meant to be protected." Fairman v. Gallagher
Warehousing Corp., 2 Phila. 620, 625 (Pa. C.P. 1979). This formulation of duty virtually ne-
gates any limitations on tort liability for breach of a public duty by the municipality.
88. Compare the five year hiatus between Ayala and passage of the Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 5311.101-.803 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), with the immediate response of the legisla-
ture to the abrogation of sovereign immunity in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways,
479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978). Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152, § 2 (codified at 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5110-5111 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80)).
89. The Local Government Commission of the Pennsylvania General Assembly under-
took an investigation of the problem at the request of various state and local officials and after
numerous complaints that municipal officials were being subjected to a large number of law-
suits. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. LOCAL GOV'T COMM'N, A WORKING PAPER - MUNICIPAL
One persistent note in the debate surrounding the Act derived simply
from a fear of the unknown. Considering the variety of governmen-
tal activities, the endless unforeseen permutations of liability-raising
situations,9" and the ingenuity of legal counsel in fashioning new
causes of action,9' public officials perceived the expanding scope of
liability as an unmanageable and undefined menace to the budgets
and administration of local governments.92 Since the adjudication of
individual claims proceeds in a fragmented and piece-meal manner,
judicial action could not possibly provide the necessary stabilization
of the boundaries of liability that a statutory scheme could afford.
Consequently, the shifting of the policy-making role back to the leg-
islature and out of the hands of the courts became one of the press-
ing goals of the Act.93
Exacerbating this fear of unlimited liability was the very harsh
reality of a virtually nonexistent insurance market.94 Even when
available, high insurance costs made coverage prohibitive. As the
TORT LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA; ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Preface, 17 (1977) [herein-
after cited as A WORKING PAPER]; TESTIMONY ON S. No. 1477 BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON
LOCAL GOV'T (Aug. 21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as TESTIMONY ON S. No. 1477] (statement on
behalf of Pa. State Ass'n of County Comm'rs 1).
90. One commentator chronicled the liability woes of the county of Los Angeles after
abrogation of governmental immunity:
The claims range from those totaling millions of dollars resulting from landslide
damage allegedly caused by construction of a county road, to minor damage claims
for false teeth lost by patients at the county hospital and damage to the trousers of a
lawyer which were torn on an allegedly defective chair in the county court house.
Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 8, at 170.
91. The problem of suits brought for their nuisance value is not a new one: "A statute of
James I (1609), complaining against the 'many causeless and contentious suits which have
been and daily are commenced' by 'evil-disposed, contentious persons' . . . provides that a
losing plaintiff shall pay double costs." Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers.- Sover-
eign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. i, 10 (1963) (citation omitted).
92. "Because of that case [Ayala], no one knows what is or is not an act which can be
challenged." TESTIMONY ON S. No. 1477, supra note 89 (statement on behalf of Pa. State
Ass'n. of Twp. Supervisors at 1).
93. "Courts are continually stripping away the immunity of government units and offi-
cials." Id (statement on behalf of Pa. State Ass'n. of County Comm'rs at 2). One insurance
official referred to the problem as "the shifting sands of case law." Id (statement on behalf of
Commonwealth of Pa. Insurance Dep't at 3).
94. While the fear of unlimited tort liability was heightened by the skyrocketing cost of
insurance (or the absence of insurance altogether), the tight insurance market appears directly
related to that very same possibility of unlimited liability. As noted in the public hearings,
"Underwriters are all too aware that doctrines of immunity, and the scope and bases of liabil-
ity can shift drastically at any time, thus exposing them to serious and totally unanticipated
losses. This is one of the principal reasons why companies have generally avoided this mar-
ket." Id
This statement indicates that even in the best of economic times few companies have
ventured into the governmental liability market. This reluctance is partially a function of the
limited number of exposures: 48 cities of the third class and 962 boroughs, for example. As a
result, insurers find it very difficult to obtain a broad base of business and to define standarized
risk criteria. Id at 2-3. Ironically, a key impetus toward the demise of governmental immu-
nity was the availability of insurance to protect the public purse. See note 29 and accompany-
ing text supra.
Other jurisdictions are facing this same insurance crunch. See Wooderson & Hoffpauir,
Risk Management in a Southern City, I I URBAN LAW. 396, 397-98 (1979); Legislative Solution,
supra note 1, at 327 n.122.
Local Government Commission noted, "[w]ith inflationary costs and
limited budgets local governments are again in the situation well
faced by the Russell court - 'no fund out of which satisfaction can be
made.' "' The real costs of such theoretical policy considerations as
"equitable loss distribution" and "enterprise liability" were begin-
ning to be understood in concrete terms - the taxpayers' dollars.
These dual fears of unlimited liability and inadequate insurance
engendered a third, related concern. Although the Ayala decision
did not affect official immunity,96 government interest groups viewed
the decision as indicative of a general trend to remove the common-
law protections against liability.97 Representatives of local govern-
ment interests recognized that if municipal officials were stripped of
their protective immunity few would be willing to jeopardize their
personal holdings, especially those officials who served in a volun-
teer or part-time capacity.9" In addition, such exposure to liability
might inhibit the effective functioning of these government employ-
ees.9 9 Thus one of the primary purposes of the Act was to insure the
continued protection of public officials from potential tort liability
and harassment. 1O
Accordingly, the supporters and drafters of the legislation
hoped that the enactment of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act would define the scope of governmental liability,"° I stabilize the
insurance market, and protect the limited financial resources of mu-
nicipalities and their officers. The objectives of the Act were not an-
tithetical to the social philosophy expressed in the Ayala decision. 1
0 2
95. A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89, at 14.
96. The doctrine of official immunity was reaffirmed in Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa. Super.
Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975). But see note 100 infra (subsequent judicial restriction of official
immunity).
97. See A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89, at 17.
98. TESTIMONY ON S. No. 1477, supra note 89 (statement on behalf of Pa. State Ass'n. of
County Comm'rs, at 2, and Statement on behalf of Pa. League of Cities at 1).
99. See A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89, at 16.
100. "To insure the continued protection of public officials the legislature should perhaps
undertake to codify the doctrine of official immunity as expressed in Pennsylvania case law."
Id at 17.
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania severely restricted the application
of official immunity in DuBree v. Commonwealth of Pa., 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
The court held that official immunity should be determined on a case-by-case basis consider-
ing (1) whether public policy would be promoted in shielding the defendant from liability; (2)
whether the action complained of could be measured against a predictable standard of care; (3)
whether, but for the defendant's status, a right of action would lie under analogous rules of
law; and (4) whether the plaintiff has improperly failed to avail himself of other available
remedies. Id The DuBree formulation was held applicable to local officials in the companion
case of Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 481 Pa. 554, 393 A.2d 300 (1978). With these two
decisions, government interest groups perceived the need for a legislative response to the im-
munity problem as imperative.
101. One anticipated benefit of immunity legislation was a general clarification of the state
of the law and the enactment of a single comprehensive, cohesive program for both state and
local tort liability. See A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89 at iv.
102. See notes 66, 22-29 and accompanying text supra.
On the contrary, the Local Government Commission noted in its re-
port that "[p]rivate citizens are not exempt from tort liability simply
because they cannot obtain insurance or because they cannot afford
to pay a judgment .... 13 [T]he payment of claims for the torts of




The outcome of both extended study and last-minute compro-
mise, 0 5 the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act restores the pro-
tective cloak of immunity, 0 6 except in eight specifically designated
areas of governmental activity: municipal operation of motor vehi-
cles; care, custody, or control of the personal property of others in
the possession of the political subdivision; care, custody, or control
of real property in the possession of the political subdivision; danger-
ous conditions of traffic or street lights under the care, custody, or
control of the political subdivision; dangerous conditions of the mu-
nicipality's utility systems located in rights of way; dangerous condi-
tions of streets; dangerous conditions of sidewalks; and care, custody,
or control of animals in the possession or control of the political sub-
division. 107
The Act establishes a three-step process for the determination of
whether a cause of action exists against a political subdivision.
Before a court can recognize a plaintiff's complaint, it must inquire,
first, whether the plaintiffs injury was the result of negligent conduct
that occurred in connection with one of the specified categories of
liability;0 8 second, whether the conduct was that of an officer, em-
103. See A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89, at 15.
104. Id at 18. At the outset, the drafters of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act were
mindful of the competing interests demanding their attention. The "legislative findings and
intent" of the bill as first drafted and presented to the Senate stated:
(a) The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that exposure of employees and
officials of political subdivisions to tort claims . . . has a negative effect upon the
performance of. . . duties. Further it provides an obstacle to the discharge of the
public business. . . . (b) The General Assembly further declares that any person
should be legally entitled to recover damages. . . due to a negligent or wrongful act
committed by either a political subdivision or ... officials thereof ....
PA. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 1871, Session of 1978, § 102 (emphasis added). Later versions of
the bill eliminated subsection (b). See PA. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 2163, Session of 1978,
§ 102(b).
105. See Aman, Practicing Under the New Pennsylvania Municipal Tort Claims Act, 50 PA.
B.A.Q. 122, 122-23 (1979).
106. "Except as otherwise provided in this act, no political subdivision shall be liable for
damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act or omission of the
political subdivision or an employee thereof or any other person." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 5311.201 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added).
107. Id § 5311.202(b)(l)-(8). The individual categories are considered in more detail at
notes 163-212 and accompanying text infra.
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Section 202(a) re-
quires that the injury occur as a result of one of the actions or activities set forth in § 202(b).
See note 158 infra (limitation to negligence).
ployee, or agent of the political subdivision acting within the scope
of his employment; 0 9 and last, whether a cause of action would exist
at common-law or by statutory creation if the tortfeasor did not have
official or governmental status. " 0 The public entity is subject to lia-
bility only if all three of these conditions are met."I
An action against a government official requires a similar analy-
sis since Section 301 of the Act provides that an employee is liable
"only to the same extent as his employing subdivision."" 2 Section
302, however, imposes several additional criteria, or "defenses," that
a court must consider. Even if all three of the previous conditions
are met, the reviewing court must still consider: first, whether the
employee's conduct was authorized or required by law, or the em-
ployee in good faith believed it was; 1 3 second, whether the em-
ployee acted within the policymaking discretion granted to him by
law;' I and last, whether the employee has any common-law de-
109. Id § 5311.202(a)(2). The definition of "employee of a political subdivision" does not
include independent contractors "over which the political subdivision has no legal right of
control." 1d § 5311.102. This exclusion was the general rule at common-law. See Painter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213 (1864); Celender v. Allegheny County Sanitary Auth., 208 Pa.
Super. Ct. 390, 222 A.2d 461 (1966).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). This subsection
uses the word "person." " .'[Pierson.' Includes a corporation, partnership, and association, as
well as a natural person." I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The New
York Court of Claims Act, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963), and the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976), both contain language that charges the govern-
mental body with responsibility for its torts in the same manner as a private individual or a
corporation. The New York courts and the federal courts have interpreted the respective stat-
utes to exclude liability for activities for which no private counterpart exists. Although this
preservation of immunity for uniquely governmental functions might be viewed as a reincar-
nation of the governmental-proprietary distinction, in practice, the exception has been applied
to a much narrower range of activities. The use of the word "person" in the Political Subdivi-
sions Tort Claims Act raises the possibility of a similar exception in Pennsylvania. See Henke,
Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law from a National Perspective, 48 ORE. L. REV. 95,
103-06 (1968).
111. In effect, the Act merely substitutes the determination of whether the injury falls
within one of the eight categories for the pre-Ayala threshold question of whether the injury
was incurred as a result of a proprietary or governmental activity. See note 47 and accompa-
nying text supra.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.301 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The implications of this
section are discussed at notes 213-33 and accompanying text infra.
113. Id. § 5311.302. The "good faith" defense that appears in subsection (2) of § 302 has
two possible sources. The law of business corporations provides for the indemnification of
directors, officers, agents, and employees who act in good faith and in a manner reasonably
believed to be lawful and in the best interest of the corporation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1410(A) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Additionally, a "good faith" defense has been recognized in cases concerning government
officials (particularly police) who act under an unconstitutional statute that they believe valid.
The courts, however, have often misapplied this defense to situations in which officers are not
acting pursuant to a statutory authority but rather under the mistaken belief that their conduct
is authorized by law. See generally Comment, Accountabilityfor Government Misconduct. Lim-
iting Qualified Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 938 (1976).
Because of this confusion, some writers have advocated a simpler test, which might also
be appropriate in the context of official tort liability: whether the officer has acted with proper
motives and with due care and diligence in the performance of his official duties. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 991.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.302(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
fenses he can assert." 5 Any one of these "defenses" may prevent the
plaintiff from recovering in an action against an official. In this
manner, the Act serves as an effective barrier to personal tort liability
in most situations.
Beyond these requirements limiting the tort actions that may be
brought against a political subdivision or government official, Chap-
ter Four of the Act also restricts the types and amount of damages
recoverable in those causes of action that are permitted. 1 6  A
$500,000 ceiling is placed on damages in any one occurrence or se-
ries of occurrences." 7 Section 403 recognizes most of the traditional
personal injury and property damages available at common-law, but
limits recovery for pain and suffering to cases of death or to cases of
permanent disfigurement, dismemberment, or loss of bodily function
in which the actual medical expenses exceed $1,500.118 Loss of prof-
its in a property damage case and punitive damages do not appear
recoverable. '" Furthermore, Section 405 of the Act alters the com-
mon-law collateral source rule 120 by requiring that the claimant's in-
115. Id § 5311.302(1).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.401-.405 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). These provisions of
the Act will undoubtedly be challenged as unconstitutional based on Article III, § 18 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 18 provides that the legislature may enact workmen's
compensation laws "but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be
recovered for injuries to persons or property." Id
The drafters of the Act were well aware of this constitutional provision and of the
problems posed by a limitation on damages. At one point the ceiling on a maximum recovery
was removed from the bill. See PA. S. No. 1477 Printer's No. 2010, Session of 1978, § 102. In
legislative debate, Senator Duffield characterized the restriction as unconscionable. PA. LEGIS-
LATIVE J.-SENATE 1130 (November 15, 1978). Local interest groups, however, obected to un-
limited liability. See TESTIMONY ON PA. S. No. 1477 supra note 89 (statement on behalf of Pa.
State Ass'n of County Comm'rs at 3; statement on behalf of Pa. State Ass'n of Twp. Supervi-
sors at 2; and statement on behalf of Pa. League of Cities at 5).
In addition, Article I, § I I of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, "All courts shall be
open, and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law .. " PA. CONST., art. I, § 1I. This provision of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, coupled with equal protection and due process arguments under the
United States Constitution, raises questions concerning the constitutionality of the entire struc-
ture of the Act.
A discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this comment. See Barrett & Hodge,
Tort Liability of Local Governments, 3 Phila. (i),(v)-(vii) (Pa. C.P. 1979) for a brief analysis of
the state constitutional questions. A consideration of the Pennsylvania constitutional provi-
sions in regard to similar infirmities in the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act
appears in Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975). For an invaluable summary
of case law in other jurisdictions, see Legislative Solution, supra note I, at 310 n.27. See also
Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liabili Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN.
L. REV. 163, 225-27 (1963).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.402 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
118. Id § 5311.403(2). The language of subsection (2)(ii) precludes recovery for pain and
suffering by a victim with a soft tissue injury even if the medical expenses exceeded the statu-
tory threshold amount. For a discussion regarding a similar provision in New Jersey's law,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2d (West Supp. 1980-81), see Comment, The New Jersey Tort Claims
Act. .4 Step Forward, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 284, 316-17 (1974).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.403 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See generally Comment,
Punitive Damage Liability of Municipal Corporations in Pennsylvania, 84 DICK. L. REV. 267
(1980).
120. Payments to a tort victim from sources other than the tortfeasor, such as benefits from
surance benefits, with the exception of benefits received under a life
insurance policy, be deducted from the damages he would otherwise
be entitled to recover under the Act.'
21
Procedurally, the Act substantially re-enacts the six-month writ-
ten notice prerequisite that was formerly a part of the Judicial
Code.' 22 That provision, barring an action against a governmental
unit upon failure to provide timely notice of the claim, had been the
law since 1937.123 The bar may be overcome if the claimant can
reasonably explain his failure to give the required notice. 24 In con-
trast to previous law, the Act permits a ninety day extension in the
event that incapacitation or disability precludes giving notice.' 25 In
addition, unlike the former provision, the notice requirement is
waived if the political subdivision had "actual or constructive notice
of the incident or condition giving rise to an individual's claim.'
126
Other significant provisions of the Act deal with legal assist-
ance, ' 27 indemnification, 128 and insurance. 129 The political subdivi-
sion is required to defend an official upon written request unless no
allegation exists that the challenged conduct was within the scope of
his employment 130 or if his actions constituted a crime, actual fraud,
actual malice, or willful misconduct. 131 Similarly, the governmental
unit must indemnify the employee following a judicial determina-
tion that his action was within the scope of his duties or that he rea-
sonably believed in good faith that it was within the scope of his
employment. 32 The ability of local governments to meet these
financial obligations is considerably broadened through authoriza-
tions in the Act to purchase insurance. A political subdivision has
the option to purchase insurance for itself and its employees, to self
insure, or to enter into joint insurance purchase agreements. In ad-
dition, the Act authorizes the employment of professional risk man-
agers and the negotiation of joint risk-management contracts. 
133
a private insurance plan, are known as collateral source benefits. At common-law, these pay-
ments do not preclude or reduce recovery from the tortfeasor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 920A (1979).
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.405 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
122. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (repealed where incon-
sistent with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.504 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80)). Similar notice provi-
sions in other jurisdictions have met constitutional challenges. See Legislative Solution, supra
note 1, at 310 n.27.
123. Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2547, § I.
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.504(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
125. Id § 5311.504(a).
126. Id § 5311.504(b).
127. Id § 5311.303.
128. Id § 5311.304.
129. Id §§ 5311.701-.707.
130. Id § 5311.303(a), (b).
131. Id § 5311.307.
132. Id § 5311.304(a). See note 113 supra.
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 5311.701-.707 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
IV. Analysis of Municipal Tort Liability Under the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act
A. Format: The Legislative Approach
In general, the states that have attempted to deal legislatively
with the problem of municipal tort liability have elected to follow
one of two statutory formats, frequently designated as the open-end
and closed-end approaches.' 34 The open-end scheme provides for
governmental liability except in specifically protected areas. An ex-
treme example of this approach is the total blanket waiver of immu-
nity provided by the New York Court of Claims Act.' 35 A more
moderate form of open-end legislation is found in the Federal Tort
Claims Act,' 3 6 which includes several broad exceptions to liabil-
ity. 137
At the other end of the spectrum is the closed-end scheme,
which grants immunity and then waives that immunity in certain
delineated situations. 138 The most notable illustration of this scheme
is the California Tort Claims Act,' 39 which creates an extremely
complex and detailed system categorizing activities as either immune
from or subject to liability.'
40
The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act follows the closed-
end approach, providing for immunity except for the eight categories
specifically delineated within the Act. Early drafts of the bill, how-
ever, were couched in terms of open-end liability. 14  The ramifica-
tions of this change in focus are extremely significant in considering
the delicate balance of the public and private interests concerned.
Undoubtedly, the more conservative, closed-end approach was pre-
134. See generally Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 15, at 179; Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at
467-71; Legislative Solution, supra note 1, at 323; A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89, at 26-27.
135. "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as
applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations. N.Y. CT. OF
CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). But see note 110 supra.
136. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
137. Id § 2680. The most sweeping exception in the federal act is the "discretionary"
subsection. Section 2680(a) excludes liability for acts done with due care in the execution of a
statute or regulation, even though it is invalid, or for acts or omissions that are within the
"discretionary function or duty" of any federal agency or employee.
138. In the extreme example, the Arkansas Legislature responded to judicial abrogation of
governmental immunity in Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968), by enacting a
total restoration of immunity. 1969 Ark. Acts, No. 165, § 1, p. 455 (codified at ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2901 (1979)).
139. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979).
140. In one sense, the California statute is really a third approach--categorization. The
California legislation is still a closed-end formulation, however, because the general immunity
section prevails in cases of conflict over all sections imposing liability. Id § 815(b).
Colorado has enacted a more simplified closed-end version quite close to the new Penn-
sylvania law. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to 24-10-117 (1973 & Supp. 1979). Compare
§ 24-10-106 with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
141. See PA. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 1871, Session of 1978, § 201.
ferred by the local government interests 4 2 because it provides a
more certain basis upon which to calculate the financial burden of
liability.' 3 The risk of inadvertent omissions and ambiguous terms
is shifted to the plaintiff."' It becomes the plaintiffs burden to
prove that his claim falls within one of the specified categories of
liability, rather than the task of the municipality to show the applica-
bility of an exception to liability. Furthermore, courts traditionally
have narrowly construed provisions in derogation of immunity, per-
mitting liability only when expressly designated.'45 In contrast,
courts have broadly interpreted open-end statutes to permit liability
unless otherwise prohibited.'" The open-end approach thus invites
claims and court challenges. The difficulty of obtaining reasonably
priced insurance is heightened since underwriters are reluctant to
undertake coverage of such a vague and indefinite area of liabil-
ity. 1
47
The drafters of the Act perceived the uncertain exposure of mu-
nicipalities to suit and expensive insurance coverage as critical
problems in Pennsylvania. 48 Clearly, they believed that an open-
end scheme would not provide the stability and clarity in the law
necessary to solve these problems.
B. Categories of Liability
L. A Return to Pre-Ayala Law?-The preamble to the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act declares that the common-law distinc-
tions between governmental-proprietary and discretionary-ministe-
rial activities are eliminated in favor of a traditional duty analysis. 49
Although the preamble thus purports to espouse the post-Ayala sta-
tus of the law' 5° in actuality the substantive portions of the Act more
accurately reflect the pre-Ayala formulation of governmental immu-
nity. A brief perusal of the eight categories of liability established by
Section 202(b)' 5 ' of the Act reveals that they are virtually identical to
142. See A WORKING PAPER, supra note 89, at 26.
143. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO SOVER-
EIGN IMMUNITY, 811 (1963).
144. See Aman, supra note 105, at 123.
145. See Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967) (construing CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966)) (immunity prevails unless exception provided by stat-
ute). Accord Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto, 43 Cal. App. 3d 145, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 525 (1974).
146. See Swanson v. Coos County, 4 Or. App. 587, 481 P.2d 375 (1971) (construing OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-.300 (1967)) (the general rule is liability unless limited by statute). Ac-
cord Weaver v. Lane County, 10 Or. App. 281, 499 P.2d 1351 (1972).
147. See note 94 supra.
148. See notes 88-101 and accompanying text supra.
149. See PA. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 2163, Session of 1978, § 102(b).
150. See notes 67-87 and accompanying text supra.
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See note 107 and
accompanying text supra.
those areas that were customarily open to liability under case law
prior to the Ayala decision.' 5 2 Consequently, many of the previous
inconsistencies and injustices in the application of the governmental
immunity doctrine are merely transformed into a new statutory
form.
53
2. Excluded Actions. -Section 202 forms the core of the entire
statute. This section establishes the conditions that must be satisfied
before liability may arise. Liability is imposed for negligent acts or
omissions within the scope of an employee's office or duties, but only
if the acts or omissions fall within the eight specified categories of
activity listed in subsection (b).'54 Thus, the significance of Section
202 rests as much in what it excludes as in what it includes. Outside
the boundaries of the categories created by Section 202(b) are such
actions as the improper assessment of taxes, negligence in the provi-
sion of police, fire, and other services, adverse possession against po-
litical subdivisions, failure to properly supervise employees, the
seizure and detention of property, false imprisonment, improper li-
censing, negligent delay in granting permits, failure to inspect, im-
proper inspection, and the failure to enforce local ordinances. 5 5 A
number of causes of action previously available under post-Ayala
law are, therefore, eliminated by Section 202 of the Act. 15 6 Conspic-
uously absent from the areas of liability listed in Section 202(b) are
hospitals and medical facilities, which appear among the categories
enumerated in the state sovereign immunity statute.
57
It is also especially noteworthy that Section 202(a)(2) of the Act
limits liability to negligent acts or omissions and specifically prohib-
its recovery for intentional torts. 58 The language of the section im-
plicitly excludes causes of action based on a theory of strict liability,
152. See notes 49-58 and accompanying text supra.
153. See note 59 supra.
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See notes 106-11 and
accompanying text supra.
155. Although the scope of the Act will be determined definitively by judicial interpreta-
tion, a literal reading of the statute compels the conclusion that these activities, outside the
eight specified categories, are exempt from liability. See note 107 and accompanying text
supra.
156. See notes 79-87 and accompanying text supra.
157. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See also note 55
supra.
158.
A political subdivision shall be liable. . . if. . . the injury was caused by the negli-
gent acts or omissions of the political subdivision or an employee thereof acting
within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the categories listed in
this subsection. As used in this subsection, "negligent acts or omissions" shall not
include acts or omissions or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice or willful misconduct.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Although this section refers to both willful misconduct and negligent acts and omissions,
it is silent regarding "gross negligence" or "wanton misconduct." A gray area remains, there-
fore, in which recovery may or may not be permitted. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
such as injury resulting from ultrahazardous activities, since negli-
gence is a prerequisite to the liability of a political subdivision. Fur-
thermore, because Section 201 establishes the Act as the exclusive
procedure for recovery of "damages on account of any injury to a
person or property"' 59 the common-law nuisance exception to im-
munity is eliminated. A nuisance action, like any other form of neg-
ligence, must now fall within one of the eight specified categories of
liability. 60
3. Liability Checklist. -Each of the eight areas of liability per-
mitted by Section 202(b) of the Act presents individual problems of
interpretation. One cardinal rule, however, must be kept in mind at
all times: each category is specifically labeled as an exception to the
general rule of governmental immunity that is stated in Section 201
of the Act.' 6 ' Proper statutory construction dictates a strict reading
of the provisions enumerating the eight categories of liability.'62
(a) Motor vehicle operation. -Section 202(b)(1) of the Act au-
thorizes the imposition of liability for negligent acts or omissions
that occur in the operation of a motor vehicle in the possession or
control of a political subdivision.'63 This subsection represents little
more than a reenactment of previous legislation incorporated in the
Motor Vehicle Code. The pre-Ayala courts construed the previous
statute to include a qualification that a police officer, fireman, or am-
bulance driver operating under a situation of emergency would be
held to a lower standard of care. His actions would incur liability
only if he acted with reckless disregard for the public safety."'t A
new Motor Vehicle Code enacted in 1976, however, did not include
the "reckless disregard" provision of the earlier version. 65 At least
one court regarded the change in statutory language as indicative of
an intent to increase the duty imposed on operators of emergency
TORTS § 282, Comment e, at 10 (1965) with Royal Indem. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, I Phila.
110 (Pa. C.P. 1977).
This issue directly bears on the question of whether § 5311.403 permits recovery of puni-
tive damages. See Comment, Punitive Damage Liabiliy of Municipal Corporations in Penn-
sylvania, 84 DICK. L. REV. 267 (1980).
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.201 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
160. See note 48 supra.
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
162. "Exceptions expressed in a statute shall be construed to exclude all others." I PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1924 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Moreover, considering the legislative in-
tent to protect political subdivisions from liability, as expressed in the preamble of the Act, a
narrow interpretation of the categories is the most appropriate. I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1921 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
163. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Motor vehicles are
defined in this subsection as "any vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereof,
including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in air." Id
164. See note 51 supra.
165. Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1 (codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3105(e) (Purdon 1977)).
vehicles. '66 Because the Act does not repeal this portion of the 1976
Motor Vehicle Code, a simple negligence standard may now apply
in lieu of the "emergency doctrine" of prior law.
(b) Personal property of others. -Liability may occur under
Section 202(b)(2) of the Act for negligent acts or omissions in the
care, custody, or control of the personal property of others in the
possession or control of the political subdivision.167 While this pro-
vision presents few problems of interpretation, it is significant for the
difference in language from that used in the analogous section in the
state sovereign immunity statute. 6  By adding the phrase "of
others" and by restricting recoverable damages to property loss suf-
fered with respect to that same personal property in the possession or
control of the governmental unit, 169 the impact of the provision has
been drastically limited. The comparable category in the sovereign
immunity statute, in contrast, has been the basis for personal injury
actions arising out of alleged negligence with respect to state-owned
personality.7 0 The change in the language employed is clearly
aimed at eliminating this source of potential liability.
(c) A dangerous condition of traffic signals, traffic controls, street
lights or trees, utilities, streets, sidewalks. -Sections 202(b)(4), (5), (6),
& (7) impose liability for injuries resulting from the negligent crea-
tion of, or failure to remedy, dangerous conditions of traffic lights,
traffic controls, street lights, trees, utilities, streets, and sidewalks. A
common approach unites these four subsections: each establishes
two prerequisites for a plaintiffs recovery."' The first requirement,
166. Junk v. East End Fire Dep't, 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 473, 483 n.2, 396 A.2d 1269, 1273 n.2
(1978). But see W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 168-69.
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
168. Section 51 10(a)(3) of the sovereign immunity act waives liability for "Damages
caused by the care, custody or control of personal property in the possession of Common-
wealth agencies, including Commonwealth owned property of persons held by the Common-
wealth .. " 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
169. Consequential damages are also excluded. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(2)
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
170. See Lerner v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 460, 406 A.2d
844 (1979) (claim by plaintiff injured by aluminum sign that struck his car while driving on
interstate highway); Vaughn v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 46 Pa. Commw. Ct.
101,405 A.2d 1119 (1979) (claim alleging that minor was struck by defective baseball bat while
participating in game at Youth Forestry Camp falls within personal property exception). Ar-
guably, both of these situations might fall within other categories enumerated in the Act: the
negligent care of real property, § 202(b)(3), and the dangerous condition of streets, § 202(b)(5).
Whether the scope of those categories would encompass the claims described above is subject
to the differing interpretations of the provisions. See notes 171-211 and accompanying text
infra.
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(4)-(7) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The common
language is as follows:
[TIhe claimant to recover must establish that the dangerous condition created a rea-
sonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the politi-
cal subdivision had actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice under
that "the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
of the kind of injury which was incurred . . .," simply codifies
"black-letter" tort law.' 72 Similarly, the second stipulation, that the
political subdivision receive actual or constructive notice of the con-
dition, has long been the rule invoked in highway defect cases.
173
The Act attempts to remedy the confusion created by various
formulations of the notice rule developed at common-law. 74  The
provision authorizes the finding of liability only when the municipal-
ity has either actual notice of the defect or could reasonably be
charged with notice 75 sufficiently prior to the injury to have taken
steps "to protect against the dangerous condition." Clearly, time to
cure the defect is not necessary; time to prevent the injury will suf-
fice.1 76 Moreover, Section 202(c) mandates the consideration of the
time element with reference to the actual availability of equipment,
personnel, and facilities and in light of the competing demands
placed upon them. 177 Pennsylvania thus follows New Jersey 78 and
the circumstances of the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to
have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Id
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, Comment e, at 6 (1965). See also id
§ 435, Comment c, at 452. Professor Prosser is critical of this approach. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 253.
173. "To the public it is immaterial what creates the dangerous condition. The city, after
notice, is responsible to travelers therefor .... " Lawrence v. Scranton City, 284 Pa. 215, 222,
130 A. 428, 430 (1925) (emphasis added).
174. Compare Braden v. City of Pittsburgh, 143 Pa. Super. Ct. 427, 432-33, 18 A.2d 99,
101-02 (1941) (city charged with lower standard of care; bound to inspect only at reasonably
frequent intervals) with Gerber v. City of Philadelphia, 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 119, 126 (1915) (ques-
tionable whether letting of contract itself was not sufficient notice to city). Compare Murray v.
Siegal, 413 Pa. 23, 27, 195 A.2d 790, 792 (1963) (defect must have existed a sufficient time to
have been discovered and corrected through exercise of due care) and Kaufman v. Koch, 53
Lack. 114, 116 (Pa. C.P. 1952) (must be notice and failure to remedy) with Vavasori v. Tucker,
22 Wash. 163, 164 (Pa. C.P. 1941) (city must have had sufficient time to have either cured the
defect or prevented the injury).
175. At common-law, factors influencing a finding of constructive notice included the visi-
bility of the defect and the length of time it had existed. Murray v. Siegal, 413 Pa. 23, 27-28,
195 A.2d 790, 792-93 (1963). Occasionally, the degree of danger resulting from the location of
the defect was an additional factor considered by the courts. Braden v. City of Pittsburgh, 143
Pa. Super. Ct. 427, 433, 18 A.2d 99, 102 (1941). Natural conditions of property or the inevita-
ble effects of weather also influence determinations of constructive notice. See note 207 infra.
The New Jersey definition of constructive notice contains both the time and "obvious
nature" elements. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-3 (West Supp. 1980-81).
California also defines constructive notice in terms of time and visibility, but, in addition,
allows for the admission of evidence to show what would constitute a reasonable inspection
system and what inspection system was actually used by the public entity. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 835.2 (West 1966).
176. Murray v. Siegal, 413 Pa. 23, 27, 195 A.2d 790, 792 (1963), and Kaufman v. Koch, 53
Lack. 114, 116 (1952), speak in terms of sufficient time to remedy or cure the defect. Vavasori
v. Tucker, 22 Wash. 163, 164 (Pa. C.P. 1941), adds the phrase "or prevented the injury."
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53 11.202(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Aware of the burden of maintaining extensive facilities with limited resources, at com-
mon-law the courts occasionally manifested a tendency to relax the standard of care for cities
and municipalities. See Braden v. City of Pittsburgh, 143 Pa. Super. Ct. 427, 432, 18 A.2d 99,
101 (1941).
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (West Supp. 1980-81).
California' 79 in explicitly recognizing the limited resources of mu-
nicipalities and the inherent difficulty in maintaining the miles of
roads, sidewalks, and pipes under their care. 80
In California, the public entity may assert the reasonableness of
its action or inaction based on the actual circumstances of cost, op-
portunity and practicability as a defense.'"' The New Jersey law, in
contrast, places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Under the New
Jersey provision, a showing that the government's action was "palpa-
bly unreasonable"' 82 is part of the plaintiffs prima facie case, al-
though in practice the New Jersey courts have interpreted it
otherwise.'83 The version found in the Pennsylvania Political Subdi-
vision Tort Claims Act incorporates the consideration of the availa-
bility of remedial resources into the circumstances the plaintiff must
establish as reasonably charging the political subdivision with notice
of the dangerous condition. 84 Since recovery is not permitted with-
out proving actual or constructive notice, the Act charges the claim-
ant with an almost impossible burden. He must show that the
179. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.4 (West 1966).
180. The rationale for this reservation of immunity when the municipality can show that
the exigencies of government dictated its action is cogently expressed by the Law Revision
Commission Comment to the California provision:
This defense has been provided public entities in recognition that, despite limited
manpower and budgets, there is much that they are required to do. Unlike private
enterprise, a public entity often cannot weigh the advantage of engaging in an activ-
ity against the cost and decide not to engage in it. Government cannot "go out of the
business" of governing. Therefore, a public entity should not be liable for injuries
caused by a dangerous condition if it is able to show that under all the circumstances,
including the alternative courses of action available to it and the practicability and
cost of pursuing such alternatives, its action in creating or failing to remedy the con-
dition was not unreasonable.
Id comment (West 1966).
The comment to the New Jersey statute properly pinpoints the central issue as the discre-
tionary policymaking power of local governments: "[A] public entity's discretionary decisions
to act or not to act in the face of competing demands should generally be free from the second
guessing of a coordinate branch of Government." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 comment (West
Supp. 1979). Virtually no one disagrees with that proposition. Even in jurisdictions in which a
blanket waiver of immunity is in effect the courts have generally reinstated some type of dis-
cretionary exception for policymaking decisions. See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d
63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960); Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash.
2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). See generaly P.P. Craig, Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory
Power, 94 LAW Q. REV. 428, 442-46 (1978); Jaffe, Damage Actions, supra note 10; Reynolds,
The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 (1968);
Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort Liability, 61 MARQ. L.
REV. 163 (1977); Legislative Solution, supra note 1, at 313-23; Note, The Discretionary Excep-
tion and Municipal Tort Liability.- 4 Reappraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (1968).
181. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.4(b) (West 1966).
182. "Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for
a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the
condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:4-2 (West Supp. 1980-81).
183. See Whaley v. Hudson County, 146 N.J. Super. Ct. 76, 368 A.2d 980 (1976). See also
Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968) (statutory formulation based on this
holding. Comment, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (West Supp. 1980-81)). But see Comment, supra
note 118, at 294.
184. See note 177 and accompanying text supra.
political subdivision possessed sufficient manpower and equipment,
which were not being utilized for other needs, to correct the danger-
ous situation.
The determination of municipal liability under these subsec-
tions is further clouded by the failure of the drafters to provide a
statutory definition of "dangerous condition."' The term obviously
covers patent physical defects. It could also extend to the failure to
correct physical defects caused by third parties or by natural condi-
tions.'" 6 "Dangerous condition" could further include failure to
warn of emergency situations or road hazards; failure to provide nec-
essary signs, maintenance service or traffic supervision; and negli-
gence in the design of highways and traffic controls.
87
A recent Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court case, Mistecka v.
Commonwealth,'88 construed "dangerous condition" as used in a
185. Both California and New Jersey stipulate that the risk produced by the condition
must be one of "substantial" injury. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(a) (West 1966); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:4-1(a) (West Supp. 1980-81). The Colorado statute couches its definition of danger-
ous condition in terms of risk to the public health and safety. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103
(1973).
186. The sovereign immunity statute has a special provision for highway defects resulting
from natural conditions, which requires actual written notice of the defect as a prerequisite to
recovery. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See notes 204-08
and accompanying text infra (problems of natural hazards in relation to real property under
the control of political subdivisions).
187. An early draft of the Act provided: "Nothing shall give rise to liability resulting from
the failure . . . to initially place signs, signals or warning devices when such failure is a result
of a discretionary act .. " PA. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 1871, Session of 1978, § 203. This
limitation does not appear in the "dangerous condition" subsections as finally enacted. PX.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 531 1.202(b)(4)-(7) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) Standing alone, the language
of §§ 202(b)(4)-(7) does not allow a discretionary exception to liability. While the limitation
imposed, by Section 202(c) of the Act on finding constructive notice is designed essentially to
shield the government from liability in the discretionary allocation of resources, the applica-
tion of Section 202(c) is restricted to the issue of sufficient notice: "[Tihe amount of time
reasonably required to take protective measures including inspections required by law shall be
determined with reference to the actual equipment, personnel and facilities available to the
political subdivision and the competing demands therefor." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 5311.202(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See note 177 and accompanying text supra.
Technically, the meaning of Section 202(c) could be distorted to extend to the initiation of
government policies or to the faulty design situation, but phrases such as "amount of time,"
"protective measures," and "actual equipment... available," indicate that the legislature in-
tended otherwise. Section 202(c) clearly was intended to operate in an emergency situation:
the barricade that is removed by vandals, the traffic light that ceases to function, the highway
bridge that is washed out by a sudden storm. In sum, the Act does not provide a general
discretionary exemption for design, planning, or policymaking activities on the part of local
governments.
Whether the exemption from liability for officials acting in a discretionary capacity, as
provided by Section 302 of the Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.302 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80),
may be imputed to the local government employer is considered at notes 219-23 and accompa-
nying text infra.
188. 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 267, 408 A.2d 159 (1979). The majority in Mistecka held that
averments of a continuous history of unknown assailants throwing rocks from a local highway
overpass upon a state highway to injure plaintiffs traveling on the highway were sufficient
allegations of a "dangerous condition" within the purview of the statute. Id at 273, 408 A.2d
at 161-62. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mencer asserts, however, that the majority ruling opens
the way for the imposition of liability upon the Commonwealth as a result of third party
actions or natural conditions beyond the control of the Commonwealth. Id at 278, 408 A.2d
at 163-64.
similar provision in the sovereign immunity statute 189 to mean "a
state of affairs that hampers or impedes or requires correction."' 190
This "state of affairs" test, if applied to the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act, would expose municipalities to an extremely broad
range of liability. The Mistecka definition would certainly impose
liability for design defects. Whether it also includes responsibility
for plans and facilities, initially safe, that become dangerous because
of technological developments, natural deterioration, or changing
use patterns, remains unclear.' 91
Although the legislature could not possibly specify every situa-
tion giving rise to liability, a more precise definition of "dangerous
condition" should be added to the statute to simplify future
problems of interpretation.
(d) Real property. -Section 202(b)(3) of the Act provides for
liability for negligent acts or omissions in the care, custody, or con-
trol of real property in the possession of the political subdivision.
No claim is permitted for any injury sustained by an intentional tres-
passer on the property of the political subdivision.
92
The ambiguous language of this subsection fosters speculation
concerning the extent of a municipality's liability. For example, the
statute does not provide a definition of the term "real property." If
"real property," as employed in the Act, refers to "land, and gener-
ally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land," 193 then
189. "Damages caused by a dangerous condition of Commonwealth real estate and side-
walks . . .and highways under the jurisdiction of Commonwealth agencies . 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 0(a)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
190. Mistecka v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. 267, 273, 408 A.2d 159, 162 (1979)
(quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 235 (1977)).
191. Advocates of design immunity argue that the approval of plans is peculiarly an exec-
utive or legislative function and should be free from judicial "second-guessing." The policy
considerations underlying design immunity are similar to those supporting resource allocation.
See note 180 supra.
Colorado and New Jersey provide for design immunity by statute. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-10-103 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (West Supp. 1980-81). New York has instituted a
similar policy by judicial decision. See Weiss v. Fote, N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
In California, initial design immunity is established under CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6
(West 1966), but recent court decisions have concluded that a subsequent change in conditions
may render an existing design dangerous. At that point the traditional rules of constructive
notice operate, and the public entity may be held liable for negligent failure to alleviate a
dangerous condition. See State v. Baldwin, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 491 P.2d 1121, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1972). An amendment to § 830.6, however, allows immunity to continue until funds are
available for correction, provided that adequate warnings are supplied. CAL. GOVT. CODE
§ 830.6 (West Supp. 1980).
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). This subsection
excludes "trees, streets, sidewalks, traffic signs, lights and other traffic controls, street lights and
street lighting systems and facilities of steam, sewer, water, gas and electric systems owned by
the political subdivision and located within rights of way" from the scope of "real property."
Id These items are covered elsewhere in the Act. See notes 171-91 and accompanying text
supra.
193. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (4th ed. 1959). See also Commonwealth v. Hicks,
the complicated rules that distinguish fixtures from personalty 94
may be applicable to the determination of the scope of liability
under this subsection. Questions emerge whether machinery, tools,
or furniture inside a public building are within the purview of this
category. The disturbing possibility arises that the plaintiff who slips
on the courthouse steps will have a cause of action, while the plain-
tiff who is injured when her chair collapses in the courtroom will
not. 195
The phrase "care, custody or control" in this subsection sug-
gests, however, that the provision was intended to encompass all ac-
tivities associated with real property in the possession of the political
subdivision. The absence of the "dangerous condition" terminology
used elsewhere in the Act1 96 supports this broader interpretation of
Section 202(b)(3). "Dangerous condition" implies physical attributes
of property much more readily than does the language "care, cus-
tody or control." 97 Thus, courts interpreting "care, custody or con-
trol of real property" could logically extend the category to include,
for example, the supervision of a municipal swimming pool or the
conduct of athletic events in a city park.1
98
Nonetheless, it is more probable that the drafters of the Act in-
tended liability to exist only for injuries resulting directly from the
care, custody, or control of the property itself This construction of
Section 202(b)(3) comports with plain meaning of the language
99
and with an earlier draft of the legislation.2" Moreover, the unsuc-
cessful attempts by critics of the Act to expand the categories of lia-
bility to include the use or control of machinery and tools and the
maintenance or control of recreational and athletic events further
365 Pa. 153, 154-55, 74 A.2d 178, 178-79 (1950); 1 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 18 (1964
repl. & Supp. 1979).
194. See generaly BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 16.1-.6 (3d ed. 1975); 1 THOMPSON
ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 19, 56 (1964 repl. & Supp. 1979).
195. Under pre-Ayala common-law both actions would probably be barred because the
maintenance of a county courthouse is a governmental activity. See notes 48-57 and accompa-
nying text supra. A similar problem of distinguishing between fixtures and personality arose
under the sovereign immunity statute in Manuella v. Sorgenfrei, 46 Pa. Commw. Ct. I11, 405
A.2d 1131 (1979).
196. See notes 171-91 and accompanying text supra.
197. A recent Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision, however, has interpreted
"dangerous condition," as used in the state sovereign immunity statute, to encompass hazard-
ous situations beyond merely physically defective property. See notes 188-90 and accompany-
ing text supra.
198. A strict construction of the "real property" provision to exclude torts stemming from
recreational activities would provide immunity beyond that available under the decisions of
the pre-Ayala court. These activities were never immune under Pennsylvania's common law.
See note 52 supra.
199. The common usage and meaning is the preferred construction unless technical terms
are used in the statute. I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1903 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
200. PA. S. No. 1477, Printer's No. 2163, Session of 1978, § 203.
supports a strict interpretation.2 °'
A further ambiguity in the "real property" category, Section
202(b) (3), is the absence of the foreseeability and notice require-
ments that appear in the traffic light, street, sidewalk, and utility pro-
visions of the Act. Under those subsections the plaintiff cannot
recover unless he establishes the foreseeability of the risk of injury
and the receipt by the political subdivision of actual or constructive
notice of the condition.2 °2 While the difference in statutory language
might signal a difference in treatment, the concepts of foreseeability
and reasonable standard of care are elements fundamental to any
negligence claim.20 3 Therefore, this omission should have little prac-
tical effect on the application of the "real property" subsection. The
disparity between the two versions, however, should be reconciled
and the intent of Section 202(b)(3) clarified.
A more significant oversight is the failure to consider the
problems posed by unimproved property and natural conditions of
land. Colorado, 2°4 New Jersey,20 5 and California 20 6 have all inserted
safeguards in their statutes to prevent exposure to liability for inju-
ries from natural hazards in parks and recreational properties.
These measures reflect the fear2 7 that the expense of maintaining
such properties in a safe condition, in addition to the expense of de-
fending claims, would lead many public entities to close these areas
to public use.20 8
201. C. Evans, Suggested Amendments to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act I
(Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association 1979 Convention Materials).
202. See notes 172-73 and accompanying text supra.
203. Id
204. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(e) (1973).
205. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8 (West Supp. 1980-81).
206. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 831.2, 831.4, 831.6 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980).
207. In many cases, the problem is merely a fear of litigation since courts generally will
not hold a municipality responsible for a natural condition, even if it involves public streets,
when there exists no time, notice, or necessity to correct the situation. Obviously, the assump-
tion of risk concept also enters into consideration. See Solinsky v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 375
Pa. 87, 99 A.2d 570 (1953) (plaintiff's fall was result of natural conditions, continual thawing
and freezing, rather than an artificially created danger); Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 345 Pa.
1, 25 A.2d 185 (1942) (no liability for injury incurred on rustic path in defendant's park);
Sowers v. City of Philadelphia, 63 Pa. Super. Ct. 227 (1916) (city not compelled to maintain all
paths in park as public ways). But see Paraska v. City of Scranton, 313 Pa. 227, 169 A. 434
(1933) (city responsible for injury to child from sharp stones in surfaces of ground under swing
in public park); see also Barker v. Brown, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 75, 340 A.2d 566 (1975) (distinc-
tions between natural and artificial conditions should not be applied to land in or near a devel-
oped or residential area when exercise of reasonable care would have disclosed danger posed
by trees on private property).
208. The balance of interests in this situation tips in favor of the general public good
rather than in favor of the welfare of the individual injured party. This viewpoint manifests
itself in the commentary to the New Jersey law:
In view of the limited funds available for the acquisition and improvement of
property for recreational purposes, it is not unreasonable to expect persons who vol-
untarily use unimproved public property to assume the risk of injuries arising there-
from as part of the price to be paid for benefits received.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-9 comment (West Supp. 1980-81). The New Jersey statute provides
absolute immunity regardless of whether a particular condition is a dangerous one. Id.
The "real property" subsection introduces one other noteworthy
change into the law of municipal tort liability. By establishing an
absolute bar to claims by intentional trespassers, 209 the drafters of
the Act failed to take note of the traditional qualifications to the gen-
eral rule that a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser. At common-
law, a landowner is still obligated to refrain from willful or wanton
misconduct 210 and to exercise reasonable care once the trespasser's
presence is discovered. 21 ' A literal application of Section 202(b)(3)
shields the municipality from liability even in those instances.
(e) Animals. -Section 202(b)(8), the final category of liability,
permits actions against a political subdivision for negligent acts or
omissions in the care, custody, or control of animals. Damages are
not recoverable, however, for injuries caused by wild animals.212
Consequently, the practical application of this subsection will most
likely be limited to animals used in law enforcement activities.
C Interaction of Governmental and Official Immunity
Since a government can only act through human agents, the lia-
bility of a political subdivision is based primarily on the personal
liability of its officials through the operation of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to separate
and isolate governmental immunity from official immunity.213 The
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act attempts to integrate these two
concepts, but at several key points of this interaction the drafters
have failed to clearly delineate the meaning of the statute. As a re-
sult, the particular construction that is adopted by the courts in
resolving these ambiguities will have far-reaching ramifications for
local government liability.
Section 301 of the Act 2 4 provides that a government employee
is liable only to the same extent as his government employer. Ac-
209. "[T]he political subdivision shall not be liable for damages on account of any injury
sustained by a person intentionally trespassing on real property in the possession of the politi-
cal subdivision." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
210. Engel v. Friend's Hosp., 439 Pa. 559, 266 A.2d 685 (1970); Moss v. Reading Co., 418
Pa. 598, 212 A.2d 226 (1965); Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440
(1965). An argument exists, however, that the exclusion of intentional torts ("willful miscon-
duct") as causes of action against the public entity by Section 202(a)(2), see note 158 and
accompanying text supra, also eliminates the common-law duty to trespassers to refrain from
willful misconduct or wanton negligence, rendering the trespasser qualification in Section
202(b)(3) moot.
211. Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965). Frederick v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940).
212. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(b)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). This subsection is
silent concerning wild animals in captivity. At common-law, public zoos were not subject to
the general rule of strict liability for harboring animals with dangerous propensities. Negli-
gence was necessary to impose liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 517 (1965).
213. See notes l and 11 supra.
214. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.301 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
cordingly, the official's exposure to liability is limited solely to those
eight areas delineated by Section 202(b) of the Act. 215 Not only does
this approach protect the individual employee from unlimited tort
liability,2 6 but it also prevents any indirect expansion of liability for
the municipality itself. Under Section 304 of the Act 2 1 7 a political
subdivision is obligated to indemnify a government employee for the
payment of tort judgments unless his negligent action was outside
the scope of his duties. If the official is held liable in instances in
which his employing political subdivision is protected by statutory
immunity, the political subdivision will be required, nevertheless, to
indemnify the employee. Clearly this result would defeat the munic-
ipality's immunity.21 8 Therefore, the limitation in Section 301 per-
mitting official liability only to the same extent as the liability of the
employer-government effectively prevents any such expansion of
municipal liability beyond that established by the eight categories of
Section 202(b).
Although under Section 301 of the Act the official's liability is
co-extensive with that of the government, the converse of that propo-
sition is. not necessarily true. The Act does not specifically state that
a public entity is immune from liability whenever its employee is
immune. The Pennsylvania courts have recently reiterated that an
immunity, by its very nature, is personal and may not be imputed to
an employer.21 9  If this common-law principle is adopted by the
courts in interpreting the Act, the government-employer will be un-
able to avail itself of the exceptions to liability granted to an em-
ployee by Section 302 of the Act.22' These exceptions include
immunity for policy-making decisions,22' and acts authorized or re-
quired by law.222 Municipalities will thus stand virtually devoid of
any discretionary immunity for policy decisions made within the
215. Id § 5311.202(b). See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
216. A primary goal of the Act is to shield local government officials from undue exposure
to tort liability. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
217. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.304 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
218. The immunity afforded to the state by the sovereign immunity statute may be cir-
cumvented in precisely this manner. Because the provisions outlining defenses for Common-
wealth officials do not stipulate that the employee may be liable only to the same extent as the
state, the commonwealth court recently held a state employee open to liability under the
DuBree formulation, see note 100 supra, while upholding the state's immunity under 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See Brungard v. Hartman, 46 Pa.
Cornmw. Ct. 10, 405 A.2d 1089 (1979). See also Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393
A.2d 293 (1978), in which Justice Nix comments in dissent, "As a practical matter the govern-
mental unit would be the target defendant even if we were to accept the invitation to discard
official immunity and expose the public servant to personal liability." Id at 553, 393 A.2d at
299.
219. See DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 543 n.1, 393 A.2d 293, 299 n.1 (1978).
220. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.302 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
221. Id § 5311.302(3).
222. Id § 5311.302(2).
eight categories of activities listed under Section 202(b) of the Act.223
If the courts find, however, that Section 301 was intended to
create total uniformity in the scope of governmental and official im-
munity, the vagueness of the phrase "conduct. . . authorized or re-
quired by law" 224 in Section 302(2) could offer a means of further
circumscribing the areas of permissible liability defined by Section
202(b) of the Act. "Authorized by law" might include any statutory
grant of authority, regardless of its breadth. Consequently, liability
could become dependent upon the legal status of the power or duty
under which the activity was performed, reinstating, in effect, gov-
ernmental and proprietary distinctions.
2 5
Arguments grounded on statutory construction and general
public policy buttress the position that the individual official's im-
munity should be broader than that of his governmental employer.
Section 301 restricts the liability of the official "to the same extent as
his employing political subdivision and subject to the limitations im-
posed by this chapter. ' 226 Clearly the use of the word "and" in this
context implies that the official immunity provided by the Act is in
addition to any other immunity extended by Chapter Two, the gov-
ernmental immunity portion of the Act. More importantly, Section
302 expressly states that the defenses of official immunity are to be
asserted by the employee for the employee's benefit. 22' Finally,
sound social policy dictates that the heavier burden of liability be
placed upon the employer rather than upon the individual em-
ployee.228
223. The political subdivision is not afforded any discretionary immunity of its own, but
must rely on that of its employees. See discussion at note 187 and accompanying text supra.
224. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.302(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). "The employee may
assert . . . the defense that the conduct of the employee which gave rise to the claim was
authorized or required by law, or that he in good faith reasonably believed the conduct was
authorized or required by law." Id
225. This interpretation has been suggested in regard to a similar provision, "vested by
law," in Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(3)(a) (1973).
See Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A Prescriptionfor Regression, 49
DENVER L.J. 567, 586-87 (1973).
226. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.301 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added).
227. "In any action brought against an employee of a political subdivision ... the em-
ployee may assert on his own behalf or the political subdivision may assert on his be-
half...." Id § 5311.302.
228. See notes 96-100 and accompanying text supra Professor Bermann details three ar-
guments supporting a broader scope of liability for government than for officials. First, the
prospect of governmental liability will reduce the zeal of an official considerably less than
would the fear of personal liability. The exposure of his government-employer to suit is un-
likely to change substantially the aggressive performance of his duty. Second, situations fre-
quently arise in which it is appropriate to require the government to compensate for harm
done by a public official but it is inappropriate to hold the official personally liable. Imposing
liability on the government rather than on an officer who has made an honest mistake, for
example, provides the victims with a remedy, distributes the loss over the community in whose
interest the action was presumably taken, and avoids placing the entire burden on the well-
meaning officer. Even if an official has acted culpably, placing the entire monetary burden on
his shoulders may be out of proportion to his fault: Last, some losses occasioned by govern-
mental activity may not be traceable to any particular individual employee. Professor Ber-
In limiting the official's liability to that of the public entity, Sec-
tion 301 raises one final problem. Section 202(a)(2) excludes govern-
mental liability for intentional torts.22 9 If Section 301 is applied
literally,23° a governmental official would also be immune from lia-
bility for his intentional torts. Obviously, this result was not in-
tended by the legislature, especially when Section 307 is taken into
consideration. Section 307 removes from the intentional tortfeasor
the benefits of the official immunity defenses of Section 302, the
damage limitations of Section 306, and the indemnification require-
ments of Section 304.231 Thus, a technical interpretation of Section
301 would render Section 307 absurd and ineffective 232 and contrary
to established rules of statutory construction.233 Undoubtedly, the
drafters of the Act envisioned the imposition of personal liability on
the tortfeasor alone through the combined operation of Section
202(a)(2) and Section 307. A strained and mechanistic application of
Section 301 should not be allowed to subvert that intention.
V. Conclusion
The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act represents Penn-
sylvania's legislative response to the problems of municipal tort lia-
bility in the wake of judicial abrogation of governmental immunity.
It is an attempt to stabilize the boundaries of liability, to protect local
governments and government officials, and to recompense the vic-
tims of government activity.
Substantively, the Act contracts the scope of municipal liability
to substantially the same areas of activity as under earlier, severely
restrictive common-law principles. While the obvious purpose of
this action was to bring some uniformity and consistency into munic-
ipal tort law and to define the limits of government exposure to suit,
mann favors a liability system in which all claims are brought exclusively against the
governmental unit. The government then has the authority to determine the question of culpa-
bility and to discipline the offending officer at its discretion. Bermann, Integrating Governmen-
tal and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1187, 1202-03 (1977).
229. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5311.202(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) stipulates that the
political subdivision is not liable for conduct that constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice, or willful misconduct.
230. Section 301 provides that an employee can only be liable if his political subdivision
can also be liable. Id § 5311.301.
231. In any action against a political subdivision or employee thereof for damages on
account of an injury caused by the act or omission of the employee in which it is
judicially determined that the act or omission of the employee constituted a crime,
actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct, the provisions of sections 302 (re-
lating to defense of official immunity), 304 (relating to indemnity) and 306 (relating
to limitation on damages) shall not apply.
Id § 5311.307.
232. A literal interpretation would mean that no one, government entity or individual
official, would be held responsible for the injuries incurred in cases of intentional torts.
233. "Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions." I PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1921(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); See also I PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
§ 1922(l) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
the ambiguity of many of the provisions will have exactly the oppo-
site effect. The boundaries of local government's liability cannot be
precisely located until these provisions are clarified. Piecemeal judi-
cial interpretation will defeat the objective of a comprehensive treat-
ment of municipal liability unless the legislature acts to correct the
deficiencies. Moreover, in many cases the Act has left injured indi-
viduals without any means of redress against political subdivisions.
The patent injustice of these cases demands legislative attention.
Procedurally the Act provides mechanisms that could protect lo-
cal governments and compensate victims far more effectively than
any restrictions placed on common-law tort actions. The Act autho-
rizes local governments to organize insurance pools and risk-man-
agement units. These measures, if successful, could obviate the need
to limit tort liability except in sensitive policy-making or high-risk
areas.
Any liability system, short of making the government an in-
surer, will result in inequities. The difficulty lies in fashioning a leg-
islative solution that will minimize the inequities. The Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act will require major revision before it
can achieve an adequate and equitable accommodation of the con-
flicting interests of the public and private spheres.
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